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abstract: 
Civil society has been understood as a set of social relations, but it should also be recognized as a narrative 
of social reproduction and transformation. .This narrative; however, is not so enduring-as its ideologues might have 
it. Its meaning is transformed as it comes to be embedded within various historical periods and cultural fields of 
identity and difference. In this paper, we identify patterns of exclusion and inclusion within the labilities of the 
East European civil society project in the decade preceding and the decade following communism's collapse in 
1989. We then identify two particularly important challenges to the emancipatory potential of civil society that are 
grounded in East European lifeworlds. By linking this study of civil society's lability to its normative critique, we 
seek to demonstrate civil society's continued significance to critical social theory, and Eastern Europe's importance 
for making that case. 
The Narrative of Civil Society in 
Communism's Collapse and Postcommunism's Alternative: 
Emancipation and the Challenge of Polish Protest and Baltic Nationalism 
Civil society's significance in sociology and political science as a whole appears to have increased since 
communism's collapse.* Withn Eastern Europe, however, civil society is not only a social phenomenon, but a 
discourse both shaping and useful in strategic a c t i ~ n . ~  Through its strategic invocation, civil society was critical to 
the emancipation of Eastern Europe from Soviet-type society. Its critical function in postcommunist society is less 
apparent, h ~ w e v e r . ~  By considering the abiding potential of civil society as a discourse of emancipation, we hope to 
contribute to the restoration of civil society to the center of critical ~ocial.theory.~ 
We illustrate in this paper not only why ciwil society remains an important concept for those working 
within Eastern Europe, but also why working within ,Eastern Europe is important for espanding civil society's 
critical potential. To a considerable estent, one of the problems facing critical theory is its often implicit and 
untheorized grounding in particular historical ~on te s t s .~  In this paper, we want to highlight the significance of 
working within Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for developing critical sociology, for it is here where 
the engagement with socialism as lived experience, and civil society as its most compelling alternative, are most 
palpable and consequential for imagining the significance of civil society as an emancipatoxy vision.' 
.. . Instead of civil society, identity and difference tend to assume center stage in cultural studies and much of 
cetical theory. Some of the most fruitful work in critical social theory has been in search of the engagement 
between the integrating visions of civil society and the emphases on difference in identity projects.8 In this paper, 
we seek to extend that engagement by identifjling under what conditions certain East European social practices and 
social actors are identified as commensurate with the civil society project, and under what conditions practices and 
actors are identified as antagonistic to it.' For that reason, William Connolly's recent work on the politics of 
becoming" is especially useful. Instead of considering a political project like civil society to be defined by certain 
intrinsic principles like tolerance or pluralism, we can define it relationally." In Connolly's terms, we might ask 
what the politics of becoming is in civil society projects, and how the vision of civil society changes as it comes to 
be associated with different sets of power relations. 
In this sense, we approach civil society differently than many others who focus on solely its sociological 
limitations. Rather than emphasize civil society's organizational weakness or inadequacy before the challenges of 
the "transition" from communist rule to democratic capitalism,'' we focus here on the shift in civil society's 
framing and normative penumbraeI3 in the transformational politics of Eastern Europe. Clearly, civil society's 
normative power was much greater in the 1980s when it was viewed by the East Central European democratic 
opposition and their Western allies as a politics based not only on the condemnation of communist moral failing,I4 
but also the legacy and distinction of East Centrol ~urope." Is there another way in which critical theorists might 
recover the politics of civil society for an emancipatory project that deepens, rather than limits, the democracy of 
postcommunist capitalism? 
Our approach to civil society also reflects a very differentakind of discursive,location for civil society 
within Eastern Europe. In and from the USA, civil society can be treated as a longstanding discourse in which one 
can identlfy a deep and durable structure opposing democratic and antidemocratic actors, relationships and 
institutions.I6 Eastern Europe, by contrast, has been racked by the labilities of its cultural formations." The 
elements of dominant and subordinate discourses have themselves been unstable and the criteria for recognizing 
. -  threats and promise within and across them have been altered radically over time. In this paper, we suggest broad 
patterns of and exclusion in the labilities of the East European civil society project, and how the 
substance and mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion have varied over historical periods and national spaces.'' 
Simply put, before communism's collapse, civil society tended to be an expansive discourse iwwhich its meaning 
was expanded as it included ever more types of action as consistent with its vision. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, it has tended to become a consolidating vision, in which its principal strategic function has been to identify 
who is part of the emancipatory future and who is part of the past to be transcended. .In its common rhetorical 
terms, who wants to become part of the West and Europe, and who must be leA behind in a socialist east? 
In Part I of this paper, we identify why civil society theory must be an intrinsic part of any critical theory 
of East European social transformations. We begin this paper by considering why civil society endures as a 
fundamentally important concept in the theory and practice of East European social transformations. We turn next 
to consider how it became so locally meaningful. We suggest that its power was not only conferred by its putative 
logical or political opposition to communism, but through a social process. This social process began as an 
intellectual praxis, in which intellectuals identified a wide range of autonomous activities as consistant with 
communism's alternative. In turn, these intellectuals were then inscribed as civil society's representatives when 
communist authorities and Western powers identified them as reasonable partners for negotiating communism's 
end. To conclude Part I, we consider how civil society alters its ideological function in postcommunism. We 
explain how civil society establishes its new hegemony by subtly including and excluding fonns of activity within a 
larger affirmation of certain kinds of power centered on political society and the state (civil society's guarantor and 
antithesis) and the market (civil society's Lockkan manifestation). 
In Part 11, we turn to civil society's challenge for critical theory. To be sure, civil society cannot simply 
function as a vehicle to 'clarify the struggles and wishes of the age'. It has lost its qualities as an expansive 
emancipatory vision and has been transformed into a defensive consolidating vision (perhaps explaining thereby its 
growing appeal for neofunctionalism and those who would celebrate or explain, rather than deepen and 
interrogate, democracy). Nevertheless, civil society remains necessary to critical theoretical work in Eastern 
Europe. As postcolonial studies seeks to recover a form of community denied by a nationalism that claims to 
embody that c~mmunity, '~  critical sociology out of Eastern Europe ought to elaborate that potentially emancipatory 
civil society now denied by the hegemonic contest behveen liberalism and fundamentalism, or individualism and 
collectivism. In this essay, wve offer a sociological method to elaborate that emancipatory potential. This method 
has three steps. 
In the first step, one should identify particular contradictory moments in the elaboration of the civil 
society project. Contradictory moments are those in which past expressions of civil society's potential are 
subsequently identified as their nemesis. Here we focus on two: labor movements and nationalist movements. In 
the second step, one should turn to particular manifestations of these contradictions, and explain how they have 
been constructed, by participants and by interpreters, as consistent or inconsistent with the civil society project. 
Here we focus on Polish Solidarity 1993-94 and post-Soviet Baltic nationalisms to illustrate the dilemmas of an 
" u ~ e a l  socialism" and the "small nation" in the discourse of civil society. Finally, one returns to the critical civil 
society project itself, to consider what presumptions allow exclusions and what theoretical recasting might expand, 
rather than consolidate, the vision of civil society. 
PART I: THE NECESSITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS POINT OF DEPARTURE 
In many East European countries, the gap in ideological commitment to civil society between formerly 
communist parties and newly liberal parties is not so great, and the fundamental importance of civil society might 
easily be forgotten. But the continuing contest within Russia between a vision of a great imperialist Russia and a 
more democratic Russia helps remind critical theorists that civil society is still a political accomplishment and not 
an evolutionary inevitability." Some authors even consider the return of another imperial type of Russia to be well 
within a realm of pos~ibility.~' Because what happens in Russia has terrific influence on what happens in the rest 
of the region, the fate of civil society in Russia remains important to its fate across the region. And if civil society 
remains only a political choice, then civil society.remains a commitment too fundamental to assign to narrow 
liberal interests. The rhetoric of civil society becomes only that much more important in light of the 1996 
presidential elections. 
Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov almost seemed to desire the consolidation of civil society 
proponents into a single camp opposing him. Consider how he spoke about Yeltsin's leadership: 
:..the road we have traveled for the past five or 10 years. On it we have lost our country, half our 
national wealth, tlie dignity of a great power, the respect of the entire world, and our confidence 
in a future for each one of us. ... lost several million of our fellowcountrymen. Our fellow 
citizens killed in tlie 200 wars and conflicts unleashed on our native soil, dead before their time, 
or not born at all ... they have stolen our faith in our own resources and our ideas of ourselves as a 
great power. We are being taught to accept promises of humanitarian aid, handouts of second 
hand clothes, and advicecum-orders from abroad on what we should be doing and how we 
should be doing it.'' ... For the first time in Russia's 1,000 year history, mothers and fathers feel 
guilty for leaving their children a half destroyed, untidy home ... And I am ashamed that I was 
once in tlie same party as the turncoats, destroyers and traitors of the Fatherland who currently 
rule in the Kremlin. 
But there is another road ... Russia's road to itself, a road to spirituality, prosperity, plenty and 
dignity. It is tlie road followed by countries against which the rest of the world now measures 
itself. These states live by the simple rule that the welfare of their citizens comes above all else. 
We simply need to shrug off our slumbering unreliability and depression, pull ourselves together, 
be ashamed for what we have done to our own history and the world of our forefathers and say to 
ourselves: We are Russia, we are a great people, and there is no power on earth that can conquer 
us. Believing in ourselves and starting to act -- that is what we want. 
This kind of invocation -- compelling with its powerful sense of victimization and injustice -- is 
nonetheless the kind of moral messianism Ernest Gellner identitifies as one of civil society's most dangerous 
alternatives, where the social order is sacralized, power is concentrated, and economic dynamism and liberty 
denied.*' Yeltsin's political program, by contrast, appeared to embrace a vitalization of civil society in Russia. 
~ e l t s i n ~ ~  of course praised his own rule and acknowledged some inistakes, but emphasized the reality and 
desireability of democracy and pluralism in Russia. He also emphasized the market model and the creation of a 
' citizenry who are owners of their own apartments, houses, and plots of land; a civic society and support for 
pluralism and the development of independent associations; an absence of real threat or aggression toward Russia; 
and finally,.the fact of the rule of law, freedom, and recognition of spirituality. Rather than invoking national 
-indignation and the consequent nostalgia for authoritarianism, Yeltsin engaged concerns for "The Individual, the 
Family, Society, [and] the State." He asked: 
How can each person live, how can he realize his potential, how is he protected in adversity and 
in his old age? 
How is every Russian family getting on, how is motherhood being supported and how is a 
mother's great labor being eased, are parents happy about their children's future? 
What does our society live on, how are its constitutional rights and freedoms being implemented, 
how are the opportunities for its spiritual and cultural developments being proved? 
Is Russian-statehood strong? Are the authorities effective, how are they ensuring prosperity, 
security, and freedom for the individual, the family, and society. Are Russian citizens proud of 
their country, is Russia respected in the world? 
These are clearly very different rhetorics. Whatever Yeltsin's own limitations as an advocate of civil 
society, the opposition between civil society and Soviet nostalgia dominated the electoral contest. Civil society and 
Soviet-style society remain even in 1996 powefil alternatives in the portrait of emancipation and reaction. 
Critical sociology must be attentive to these fundamental oppositions and should not pretend as if they are 
' 
irrelevant. They remain quite real not only in the lifeworlds of Russian citizens but also for those outside of Russia 
proper who would feel the effect of a return to Russian empire.25 Thus, one ought to begin with the conception of 
civil society by one of its principal spokespersons in general'and especially within Eastern Europe, Ernest 
For Gellner, socialism was not, and cannot be, emancipation. He writes, 
The unification of the economy in one single organization and its fusion with the political and 
ideological hierarchy is not merely most inefficient: it also inevitably leads to both totalitarianism 
and humbug. In an industrial society, full socialism cannot but be totalitarian -- and 
totalitarianism cannot but be socialist. To allow an independent economic zone is to leave an 
enormous breach in the authoritarian system, given the importance of the economy. To deprive 
civil society of an independent economic bases is to throttle it, given the inevitability of political 
centralization. (p. 164). 
Gellner's apparently fundamentalist position in support of civil society is a useful point of departure for a critical 
- .  
theory engaging East European emancipation. It is even more useful than beginning with familiar critical 
theoretical positions. For many critical theorists, socialism is an ontologically absent but epistemologically 
structuring desire; in Eastern Europe, socialism has been a lived experience." In the shadow of communist rule, 
-- and with the potential threat of Russian imperial ambition, civil society is the foundation of emancipation." It 
continues to structure alternatives, and thus Gellner offers auseful point of departure for a critical social theory of 
civil society. 
What matters first and foremost for Gellner is whether the system is pluralist in a certain fa~hion. '~ Of 
course there must be political constraints put on the economy.30 His fundamental point is that political control 
must be balanced by 'an autonomous set of production  unit^'.^' Pluralism should exist within a desanctified 
ideological order, where no one vision is unassailable. Positions of power should not be the most lucrative in 
society, and rather these should be found in the economic sector. And individuals should be modular -- acquiring 
and disposing of identities as interactions demand, within a basic nationalist frame where all speak some kind of 
common language and have a common ideological referent. These are the preconditions for democracy, he argues, 
and one might say by extension, for eman~ipation.~' The book's virtue partially lies with Gellner's rhetorical 
appeal. What critical theorist would dislike a system where it is unclear who exactly is the boss?!33 
At the same time, however, critical theory should not be constrained and limited by Gellner's discursive 
polarities. Indeed, we suggest that to leave civil society where it is potentially enervates its conceptual power. 
Although ~ e l l n e r  recognizes the sociological foundations that make civil society strong and weak, he doesn't 
engage whether the vision of civil society can eqand in cultural forms and theoretical imaginations. Indeed, 
mindful of his treatment of nat iona~ism,~~ he finds the notion of civil society also to be simple.3s But questions of 
how formations of identity and difference articulate with civil society's own inclusive and emancipatory potential 
are not so simple. We fear that Gellner's framing ultimately weakens civil society both as a political and analytical 
concept. It fails to explore whether civil society itself cultivates the possibilities of its own progressive 
supersessions, or whether its deployment only encourages its advocates to imagine alternatives to be inferior 
fundamentalisms. Might, in Connolly's formulation, civil society become something different once it realizes its 
most obvious projects? What thematics lead it to become expansive and emancipatory, and what thematics lead it 
to become a defensive and consolidating vision? In the next section, we consider how civil society functioned as an 
emancipatory project through 1989 in Eastern Europe and through.1991 in the former Soviet Union. This story is 
particularly important for it explains the historical process with which civil society acquired a sense of necessity in 
emancipation. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS ANTI-COMMUNIST HEGEMONIC PROJECT 
Democracy could be celebrated in 1989 because it, and its specific associations, the rule of law and civil 
- .  society, were evident in the transformations of Soviet-type societies, in general, and especially in East Central 
Europe. The rule of law was only partially instantiated before communism's collapse, as when the Hungarian 
opposition took seriously various constitutional rules to put their own people in electoral contests. For the most 
part, however, the rule of law was associated with the change only because its leaders said that this was their 
intention.36 Civil society was more widely evident. At least it was thought to be. 
Civil society's promise was based not only on the normative commitments associated with its liberal 
defenders, but also with the appearance of public action in its behalf. The most obvious manifestation of civil 
society's existence was the prevalence of opposition intellectuals speaking the rhetoric of civil society -- 
democracy, public sphere, rule of law, and so on. Not every society had prominent figures like Poland's Adam 
Michnik, Russia's Andre Sakharov, Czechoslovakia's Vaclav Havel, and Hungary's Janos Kis, but at some level, 
there were always public figures in the anticommunist opposition who would claim this as their ideology.37 
Typically, these civil society theorists gained oppositional status only to the estent they wrote for an alternative 
public sphere, samizdat, the parallel polis, the second society, and so on. 
More infrequently, but in some sites, one could find social movements that articulated these ideals of civil . 
society. Solidarity, from its 1980 inception through most of the 1980s, associated itself through its spokespersons 
with the celebration of civil society.38 Slovene social movements were even more clearly associated with this 
dimension of democracy's celebration. Its movements approximated the archetypal New Social Movement more 
than anywhere in Eastern ~ u r o ~ e . ~ '  
Mass public demonstrations animated with slogans of civil society dotted the regional map. The 
demonstrators' self-restraint and peaceful nature suggested a disposition of compromise many took to be associated 
with democracy itself. The Hungarian demonstration of March 15, 1988 was exemplary in this regard, as were the 
so-called 'singing revolutions' in the Baltic republics in the late 1980s, and the East German demonstrations of the 
fall of 1989. Commentators were disposed to put the civil society label on these demonstrations relatively readily,40 
in part because they could compare them to earlier protests that were focused more on wage price hikes and were 
associated with violence against Party buildings, as in the 1956 Poznan riots, or against Party members, as in the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956.~' 
The economic side of the civil society argument was a bit more complicated. On the one hand, the second 
or informal economy was even taken as evidence of a nascent civil society. Liberal commentators especially would 
take this as evidence of at least the ~ockean  versiorof civil society,42 demonstrating that people could organize 
economic activities independent of the state. Hungary was particularly celebrated in this regard.43 
More difficult for civil society theorists, or proponents, as the two were often mixed, were the labor movements. 
Of course not all labor protests or movements were associated with the building of democracy and 
especially of civil society's principles. As with most things in Romania, the labor protests in the Jiu Valley in 
Romania were difficult to identify as evidence of civil society's potential.44 The only independent trade union of 
note in Hungary's transformation was one of scientific workers, although it was explicitly aligned with civil society 
rhetori~.~'  Polish Solidarity was perhaps least difficult to align with civil society, given that it was not only a labor 
movement, but self consciously a movement for democracy.46 And at least in 1989, the miners in Eastern Ukraine 
and Western Siberia were protesting on behalf not only of greater benefits for themselves but also for more - 
independence in economic activities, lending some credence to a civil society emphasis on economic a~tivity.~'  For 
the most part, however, labor issues were left out of the rhetoric of the civil society project. In retrospect, one might 
suggest that it was a strategic omission, given the subsequent importance of economic liberalism. Nevertheless, 
one should not fail to recognize that in some places, an independent labor movement was part and parcel of the 
emancipation associated with civil society. By extension, it was certainly envisioned as part of the broad 
movement for emancipation. 
The more obviously troubling element for civil society theorists and advocates was nationalism. Today it 
is an almost boring convention to compare nationalists and democrats, advocates of the nation with advocates of 
the rule of law, proponents of collectivism and proponents of individualism. But during the opposition to 
communism, civil society advocates tended to assimilate nationalisms. Of course, there were always some 
nationalisms held at arms length -- especially those propagated by the more xenophobic and fascist organizations. 
But if one looks at the rhetoric of the dominant national movements -- Rukh in Ukraine, the Popular Fronts in the 
Baltic States, Solidarity in Poland, the Hungarian Democratic Forum --- one finds a remarkable synthesis of 
emphases on both the nation and democracy. The cases where the synthesis was rather between nationalism and 
fascism, or nationalism and communism, as in Serbia, Russia, and Romania, made democratically-oriented 
national expressions seem all the more compatible with civil society.48 
Finally, civil society was even in evidence among communists. Of course one wouldn't look to Nicolae 
Ceausescu or Eric Honecker, but various commentators emphasized the increasing reasonableness of communist 
leaders, whether Mikhail Gorbachev himself, or the liberal wing in Hungary, and even Jaruzelski in Poland. If 
they could compromise, then the possibility for a civil society transformation, one based on the rule of law itself, 
was ever so much greater. This kind of legal revolution was possible only because the authorities themselves 
wanted it 49, though it was clearly intended to strengthen rather than weaken the Communist Party's position.50 
Of course this is all quite variable. Societies vary in their overall development of civil society across these 
nodes of civil society discourse and within them. Poland was, across the board, the most "developed in its 
expression of civil society; Hungary was not so developed on the broad social movement side and certainly not so 
much in the labor movement, but its second economy was among the most developed. Czechoslovakia, especially 
the Czech side, had its prominent dissidents but little else. Bulgaria had little in any regard, and ~ o m a n i a  nd 
Albania less, until 1990. The republics in the former Yugoslavia differed considerably, but Slovenia was clearly 
associated &th the most developed civil society formation in terms of movements and communist leadership." 
Although these different formations of civil society deserve elaboration and explanation, it is important to 
recall and recognize that they were assimilated into a larger vision of civil society's ascent in a global political 
space. Within societies, and across them, the spectre of civil society haunted communism as all of its 
manifestations were knit together in one emancipatory vision that could not be resisted. This unprecedented 
combination in part accounts for the power of civil society as emancipatory concept. Civil society gained 
counterhegemonic status because intellectuals clain~ed that the variety of activities taken in opposition to 
communism were evidence ofthe incipient fort?ration of civil society. Their words became more than the 
proffering of irrelevant intellectuals not only because of the moral capital they acquired in their.politica1 
oppre~sion,'~ but because they could claim to represent civil society in negotiations with communist authorities, a 
position reinforced by international media.53 
In retrospect, this association between a broad variety of groups and interests was hardly self evident. To 
a large extent, civil society was interpreted through the lens of civil society theorists/proponents, who sought to 
construct a particular interpretation of these events. Rather than think of civil society as some set of social 
relations that elevate pluralism, legality and an open public sphere, perhaps the best conception of civil society is as 
a narrative, a discursive construction, that must be situated liistorically and in its own field of cultural referents. In 
this period, civil society was a political project in which political leaders identified various forms of opposition to 
communism as evidence of civil society in the making. It was an expansive, and emancipatory, moment. 
Of course it had its exclusions and its negative consequences, but these were minimized if not altogether 
ignored at the time by critical intellectuals. Even demonstrations highlighting the inclusive vision of civil society 
had other ambitions of a more exclusive sort. The second economy was evidence of lawlessness and not only 
independent economic organization. Nationalism, even of the most liberal variety, was premised on a form of 
exclusion as all national imaginations must be. Reformed communists were of course symbols of past privilege 
and worse. Labor movements were problematic because of their likely interest in constraining the free operation of 
the labor market itself. Only the refined civil society theorists might be read as unambiguously representing civil 
society, but even here their own limitations in representing what the protest against communism was about 
suggests the limits of civil society's universalistic vision. 
In short, one important project in retlunking civil society and the public sphere is to go back to these 
moments of civil society's expression to read them for their other expressions, and anticipations, of what we see 
today. Simultaneously, one should look for the forms of collaboration between leaders of democratic opposition 
and reformist communists. One should also consider those cultural formations that defy conventional notions of 
public spheres, such as those created by international agencies with cultural exchanges and East European 
indigenous scholars, that helped make a global referent of civil society apparent. Civil society's anticommunist 
history is yet to be written. But when it is written, and if set against its postco~nmunist expression, its tendency 
toward expansion ought to be the story's leitmotif. 
Our purpose in this brief sketch of civil society in communism's collapse is to show that while civil 
society was being touted as the most meaningful and powefil frame with which to understand the end to 
. ,  communism, it managed this with a brilliant sleight of hand. Its power was based on the conviction of its 
normative superiority as a political project, combined with the appearance of many social phenomena that could 
be used to demonstrate the inadequacy of its conzmunist rival. At the same time, recognizing difference and 
finding commonality.in a.wide range of previously incommensurate activities was why civil society could be so. 
mean ina l  for critical theory. It was a marvelous moment of promise, a frame containing a broad intersubjectivity 
with autonomy expressed in a wide variety of ways, integrated through compromise, exchange, and common 
membership in an inclusive opposition. That didn't last. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER COMMUNISM 
For some critical theorists like Adam Michnik,the problem with civil society after co~nmunism rests in its 
normalization. The very same people who 'ignited the revolution' of lighted candles'54 tend to become 
marginalized in a normal democracy. This normalization not only leads the mediocre to become the modal public 
figure, but it also means that broad moral authority and decency is replaced by petty conflict among those who 
brought down communism itself. Within Poland, according to Michnik, this loss of solidarity has meant that the 
workers/civil rights component of the great movement tends to be transformed into populism. The 
Catholicltraditional component tends to'be transformed into nationalism and the instrumental treatment of 
religion." 
Some Polish sociologists reinforce this critique of postcommunist times by indicting civil society itself. 
Civil society, they argue, has become passive. ~ ~ ~ i c a l  indicators supporting this line of argument include low 
electoral turnout, a more general disaffection from electoral politics and a general depoliticization of social life.56 
Others, however, find this depoliticization appropriate, and find civil society's vitality to esist in the growth of the 
private sector, especially private enterprise. Their slogan is "economny better than politics, and micro better than 
macroyy ."
This 'microeconomic turn' in postcommunist civil society's development corresponds to the ideological 
preferences of the more orthodox liberal in Polish political life. Even before communism's collapse, Miroslaw 
Dzielski and others looked to the vitality of the second economy as evidence for the future ideal society. They 
sought no inclusive synthesis. They celebrated the entrepreneur and the middle class. Dzielski wrote, "the person 
who trades is the pillar of civilization, and in conditions of socialism also its heroic ~hampion".'~ Alongside this 
celebration was the critique of Solidarity. The liberals considered Solidarity to be workerist and Social 
movements themselves were seen as continued reflections of appeals to the state rather than of inventing new 
forms of institutional articulation. 
Individualism vs. collectivism, rather than democracy vs. dictatorship, would thus structure the 
alternatives, and with it, civil society could take the turn toward a 'Lockean tradition' as Charles ~ a ~ l o r ~ '  has 
called it. Even for those who would criticize the narrow foundations of such a Lockean tradition, the opposition 
between individualism and collectivism would become foundational. For instance, sociologist Jerzy Szacki's 
critique of economistic liberalism in favor of integral liberalism rests on a critique of the proto-liberal. He 
identifies the movementdominated moment in civil society's elaboration as "protoliberal" because individualism 
was subordinated to the collectivist impulses from civil society writ large.6' 
Although Michnik's laments about postcommunist civil society reflect his distance from the economistic 
articulation of that vision, his perspective also is trapped in the antagonism between individualism and 
co l lec t i~ ism.~~ The individual agent of past emancipation struggles, the democratic intellectual, is marginalized in 
the present. Their voices are lost in a cacaphony of information flooding the public sphere.63 Movements are thus 
drawn to those fundamentalisms associated with collectivism, civil society's antithesis. The mobilization of 
movements only hastens the loss of civil society's emancipatory potential, therefore. Collective organization, 
without that critical democratic intellectual's empowerment, is a symptom thus of civil society's decline rather 
than its fulfillment. 
For the marsist disengaged from Eastern Europe, all of this discussion of civil society might seem 
irrelevant. Civil society has always been associated with vast material inequalities, and it should surprise no one 
that the making of postcommunist capitalism has been associated with vast increases in inequality, not only across 
statuses, but also across regions within and across the postcommunist world.64 Thus, the problem is not with civil 
society or intellectual responsibility, but with to whom the intellectual feels obliged. What, for instance, about 
intellectuals engaging the proletarians? Postcommunist labor is not, however, simply proletarian: 
PART n: THE CHALLENGE OF cnm S O C ~ T Y  
LABOR, PUBLIC PROTEST AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
One of the greatest dangers for critical theories is to consider present forms of inequality as the sole 
grounds from which to intepret social conflicts. For instance, it is tempting to associate civil society with the 
privileged because the old and new middle.classes tend to ally in support of the liberal civil society in the 
making.65 Can we then interpret the workers' relative reticence as evidence of civil society's exclusionary quality? 
Edmund Mokrzycki has challenged the simple transposition of capitalist labor relations to Eastern 
Europe. He has argued that labor's opposition is not so much a manifestation of class conflict as it is a 
manifestation of the conflict between a society made by socialists and the new system made by liberal elites.66 
Thus, one ought to consider that inequalities are at least potentially a consequence not so much of capitalism's 
introduction, but of socialism's legacy. And that is a problem for civil society. 
Ideologies and identities normally operate to reinforce each other.67 In postcommunist capitalism, 
however, the strongest 'ideology' -- liberalism -- generates a capitalist identity that can underpin the project of 
transformation. It lacks, however, clear spatial and temporal roots. The strongest identity, that of the working 
class in large factories, has several movement and organizational identities to which it can be attached, but these 
unions and movements are themselves weakened because they have no larger ideological frame that adequately 
reflects the particular demands workers make. Socialism is, given its association with the illegitimate past, 
unacceptable for current hegemonies. Where the labor movement was ovenvhelmingly a labor movement made by 
state socialism (or even worse Soviet imperial power, as in the Baltics), the chance that labor could be discursively 
constructed as anything but a reflection of the past is hard to imagine. "Unreal socialism" - a vision self 
consciously as distant from the past and as utopian as importing wholesale capitalism's wealth -- is one discursive 
possibility. We return to that possibility only after considering why it is necessary. And for that, Poland becomes 
the critical case. 
If any proletarian movement could develop an identity and ideology to challenge the hegemony of 
capitalist civil society in postcommunism while simultaneously challenging the socialist past, one might imagine 
Polish Solidarity to be so able.68 Solidarity was constructed in a society that had more movement mobilization than 
any other East European society.69 Its identity, while increasingly fragmented and market oriented through the 
1980s70, had a strong element of workers' rights alongside its anticommunist and democratic commitments. Its 
practices were based on.'solidarity', on the idea that the strong should support the weak;?' The movement even 
won the fall 1997 parliamentary elections. 
Solidarity's campaign, howvever, was not based on the deepening of either civil society rhetoric or working 
class empowerment. It was built around a national Catholic vision. Of course this laborlreligion alliance is based 
on the temfic power of the Catholic Church and the roots of the Solidarity movement in Polish Roman Catholic 
cultural  formation^.^^ However, we also believe this outcome reflects the failure of civil society discourse, and its 
inability to consider the prospects of "unreal socialism". To make the case, we shall focus on the spring of 1994, 
when Kennedy conducted fieldwork in Warsaw. The story needs a prologue that might begin with the summer of 
1989 when Solidarity formed a government.73 
Nobody espected Solidarity to take power. I t  was espected that the communists and their allies would 
guide reform, with Solidarity in a comfortable, but now legal, opposition. Forced into a position of authority, 
Solidarity leaders over the fall of 1989 searched about for a vision of transformation, especially of economic 
change. They found it in the Balcerowicz plan of 1990, in which the economy was to be transformed as rapidly as 
possible. This shock therapy not only jolted the economy, but also Solidarity's labor movement. It is difficult to 
assess the support or disdain this policy evoked. Regardless, workers did not have the organizational strength to 
resist it given the weakness of the communist-led union and the support Solidarity felt obliged to give its own 
g~vemment. '~  
The second major shock to their identity came with the "war at the top" between Tadeusz Mazowiecki and 
Lech Walesa in the presidential elections of the summer of 1990. Most of these Solidarity workers appeared to 
support Walesa, whose criticism of Mazowiecki, while not consistent, held appeal for those whose security seemed 
threatened. But after Walesa's election as president, and especially through the staunchly liberal economic regimes 
of Bielecki and Suchocka, Solidarity assumed a more oppositional stance toward the government in general. 
Protest was increasingly directed against the government and not against the specific enterprises in which 
demonstrators were employed.7s Solidarity could not, however, draw easily on the anticommunist ideology of its 
beginning. The new authorities were, after all, part of the anti-communist opposition too. Solidarity portrayed 
itself only as a movement that sought limitations to existing policies while struggling to demand that they be 
participants in the process of transformation, and not merely the objects of political The Pact on Industry, 
- .  negotiated during the end of Suchocka's government, is the result of this resistance. Before that pact could be 
implemented, however, the Suchocka government was forced out in the first half of 1993. 
New elections were held in the fall. The Solidarity movement struggled to develop a new identity that 
might win them support. Their posters emphasized that "there were many parties, but only one Solidarity". 
Solidarity emphasized that they wanted a "Poland for you," defending the weak and fighting against corruption. 
Beyond invoking a beautiful memory, Solidarity could do little to distinguish itself from the postcommunist left 
which also claimed to oppose conuption and slow down the reform. The postcommunist left finally won the 
elections and this was the final shock. After bringing down communism, Solidarity's liberals and workers both 
were out of power. The union itself was out of parliament thanks to new election laws. 
These new political conditions, with a postcommunist left in power and the trade union out of 
parliament, were a serious defeat for Solidarity. At the same time, it gave Solidarity activists a new set of 
conditions that enabled them to reconstruct an ideology and a new identity with which to challenge power. The 
parameters of that search can be esplored by returning to May 27, 1994, when Solidarity staged a major 
demonstration in ~ a r s a w . ~ ~  
Organizers expected 50,000-70,000 protesters, but estimated that 30,000 actually participated on a 
beautiful day. Television commentators that evening estimated that there were 10,000 to 15,000 protesters present. 
Assembling on Pilsudski square for two hours, the demonstrators marched through the streets of Warsaw chanting 
and carrying various placards. 
There were several dominant themes on the 42 different slogans that Kennedy re~orded.~' Complaints of 
impoverishment were easily dominant with 25 of the 42 iterating this theme. Although some of the placards spoke 
of poverty in general, many were specific, naming health care, pensioners, peasants, and children as the victims of 
transition. In this sense, there was a clear identity: we are victims, or at least we speak for the victims. There were 
general demands, like for bread and work or for dignified work. There also were more specific demands: 
increasing the funds allocated to health care and education, for instance, or getting rid of the tax on wage hikes, or 
for guaranteeing a living wage. Only one placard was observed to deal directly with the method of reform itself 
Restructuring yes, breakup no (Restrukturyzacja tak, wydzieliania nie ). 
Many placards also conveyed a temfic sense of impatience: "patience has its limits". And they demanded 
better relations: "Instead of a hoa.., we demand honest treatment". Few seemed to appreciate their government. 
"Precz", an old Polish word associated with the patriarch of a peasant household yelling 'out with you' but now 
having a general meaning (retaining the disgust) was used frequently. "Out with the thieves" or "out with the 
communists" were very common. One placard suggested that the communists go to Cuba. One camed around an 
empty cell for the Labor Minister Leszek Miller. Others carried implicit threats: "Today with flowers, 
tomorrow???? ..." "If you support the government, you will die". 
By themselves, these do not construct an alternative to existing civil society as discourse. They identify 
what is wrong and who is suffering, and to a lesser degree, who is responsible and what can be done. Consider, 
however, the following slogans that appeared at the demonstration: "A state of freedom doesn't mean impunity"; 
"Try to live on these wages"; and "It has to be otherwise, for it is worse". These slogans anticipate the construction 
of a protest identity that, like others at the demonstration, is founded on dissatisfaction with the state of the society 
and the actions of the government. However, they (and some others like them) diverge from the general rhetoric of 
discontent in that they zero in on the condition of postcommunist capitalism. They begin to draw the outlines of a 
case for a critique of a postcommunist development that by-passes social welfare in its rush to market. Elaborations 
by its intellectuals are more usefbl for finding how Solidarity's protest fits with civil society's potential. 
One of the leading voices of this Solidarity opposition was Maciej Jankowski, the leader of the Mazovian 
Regional group in Solidarity. The outlines of his position could be found in a contemporary interview." 
Jankowski sought to construct a new "other". One of his familiar slogans is this: "They are playing their own 
games in their own classws0, refemng to the government, parliament and.president. There is no significant 
difference, he argues; among parties, whether they came from Solidarity or not. They all forget about the base of 
the movement and society is excluded from the making of reform. Elections are not enough; "democratic elections 
don't mean that the state is democratic". The leadership, he suggests, doesn't act democratically, but rather with 
Bolshevik arrogance. People know that elections don't matter, since what they vote for and what the government 
subsequently does are entirely separate. Government, whether from Solidarity or by Communists, is the 
antagonistic "other". Capitalism, though, is not the enemy; indeed, at one point he invokes Japan as a positive 
\\ example, saying that there the relation of income of employee to management is 1 to 4; in Poland it is 1 to 40. 
As Jankowski constructs "them", he formulates an oppositional "we." Solidarity, he says, is not 
egalitarian, but he does say that there should be equal chances and that one should earn according to one's 
achievements. Politicians are making more than their share, as are managers. Defending his movement against 
the charge of socialist-type egalitarianism, he says "Egalitarianism is bad, but elitism ... is worse". And he also 
finds it strange that to engage in struggle on behalf of the most poorly paid is anti-reformist. This is not socialism, 
he argues. Solidarity, he argues, does not aspire to represent everyone, only the interests of 30 to 40 per cent of the 
society. But he proposes that the labor movement in Solidarity needs to be partners, as it is in other parts of the 
free market world. This is all he offers, programmatically: the need to be partners in government and in capital's 
management. They need to be able to negotiate. 
Solidarity's protest and ideology in formation thus remained quite a part of the civil society project. On 
the one hand, it portrayed itself through peacehl protest as a strong force that is capable not only of representing 
its base, but also representing those less able to defend themselves.. It continued its tradition ofso~idari@.~' On the 
other hand, Solidarity also sought to emphasize the importance of negotiation and contpron~ise. Postcommunist 
capitalism, they argued, should be based on a negotiated settlement between the interests of capital and labor, and 
not just the dictates of capital. At the same time, however, Solidarity also suggested elements that risked civil 
society's simple association. 
Like Zyuganov's Russian communists, Solidarity's emergent ideology rested on strengthening and 
deepening a sense of victimization. This v~ctimization was attached, then, to a notion of the sacred and profane in . 
political terms, except in mirror image to Zyuganov. Rather than the liberals destroying the nation's tradition as in 
Russia, in Poland, the communists are the villains. 
Solidarity had to retain its anticommunist emphasis for several reasons. First and most obvious is the 
need to establish distance from the continuing illegitimacy of the old regime. All actors do this, even if Solidarity 
does not need to do it as much as other more politically incriminated actors. Second, anticommunist rhetoric has 
become newly sensible, since the former communists-are now back in power and anti-governmental demonstrations 
can acquire added emotive punch by adding the anticommunist theme. Third, anticommunist rhetoric 
distinguishes Solidarity from its principal opponent in the labor field. This is the other "other" in the rhetoric of 
many of Solidarity's leading political activists. 
Although it was surprisingly not present in any of the leaflets or placards at the May 1994 demonstration, 
one of the implicit issues of the protest was a demand for one-on-one negotiations with the government. Solidarity 
felt that they should represent labor specifically, and not include the formerly communist-sponsored trade union 
OPZZ. In addition, the OPZZ held resources bequeathed to it by the Communist government in the 1980s that 
Solidarity felt it rightfully owned. This appears to be another war at the top, however, to many workers. 
On the shopfloor, there is more cooperation among union activists and regular workers than the relations 
between union leaders would suggest. Kennedy's interviews with protesters suggested that there is really little 
conflict with other unions on the shopfloor itself. The 'class conflict' generated identities appear to have little need 
for these different union &liations; on the other hand, these union affiliations bring with them inherited identities 
that bespeak former conflicts and compromise, and too they reflect a real fight in the political domain, if not in the 
social one. The 1994 strike in the Lucchini Steel Mill, jointly organized by OPZZ and Solidarity, is one 
manifestation of this potential for c~ope ra t ion .~~  
Anticommunist rlietohc, although an important element of Solidarity's cultural heritage and newly 
relevant in a variety of ways, actually impeded the formation of an ideology that could mobilize the larger identity 
of postcommunist proletarians. This anticommunist rhetoric expresses an identity and ideology that Solidarity's 
political activists no doubt find important; but at the same time, it represses a new ideology emergent from the 
social conditions post-communist capitalism generates. We see the beginnings of this ideology forming in some 
dimensions of public protest and in Jankowski's interview. Its elements include a demand for dignified work and a 
decent standard of living for the dispossessed. It refuses to distinguish between "our" politicians and "their" 
politicians". It refuses to accept the equation of elections with democratic governance. It seeks to define democracy 
in terms of negotiations with the society's proletarians. It is more critical of elitism than of egalitarianism. This 
new vision is certainly associated with a strong identity rooted in employment in the state firms and the state sector 
of education and health more generally. 
Tlus new ideological orientation is attacked on two grounds. On the one hand, intellectuals frequently 
charge that it is Certainly movements have this potential in this part of the world; indeed, without the 
extensive work of organic intellectuals committed to more rational and democratic critiques of post-communist 
capitalism, one could imagine proletarian opposition taking a turn reminiscent of Machajski's indictment of all 
politics and officials. 84 
At the same time, without populist pressure, intellectuals do not seem inclined to work within the 
proletarian left, given the-disfavor with which socialism, as an intellectual tradition, is viewed: And to the extent 
this movement can be tarred with the label of socialism, it can be accused of endangering the successhl exit from 
the past. 
In retrospect, this gulf between democratic left intellectuals and Solidarity pushed the latter toward the 
national Catholic political establishment. And it would be easy to see this as inevitable, given that the democratic 
intellectuals put markets before labor in their vision of civil society. But that particular construction of civil society 
was not necessary. Jacek Kuron, former Solidarity advisor, former Minister of Social Welfare and 1995 
presidential candidate representing the democratic intellectuals' "Freedom Union" certainly saw that. He argued 
that Poland made a mistake: it tried to build capitalism before its welfare state, and needed to build a Republic for 
Everybody (Rzeczpospolita dla kazdego ).85 Political intellectuals, he said, needed to recognize and empower the 
activities everyday people are undertaking to develop their societies, whether in postcommunist or Western 
capitalist ~ocieties.'~ Kuron was certainly trying to push the boundaries of what was civil society, but one could 
imagine those boundaries being still pushed further. Kuron kept organized labor at a distance in these accounts, 
and indeed, maintained a strict distance from socialism as a legitimate element of postcommunist capitalism's civil 
society. And of course, real socialism remains civil society's antagonist. But Unreal Socialism might not. 
Unreal socialism is a vision of socialism emphasizing its negation of the past in some sense. It is not the 
same as the socialism that was practiced in Poland's Soviet-type society. Unreal socialism might also mean that 
this socialism is impractical; at least this is the spin that Boguslaw Mazur wanted to put on the term in his article 
in   pro st.^' But practicality is itself a product of certain social relations, and does not exist in abstract theoretical 
space. The rhetoric of an unreal socialism, a utopianism that emphasizes all flights from real socialism are to one 
degree or another utopian, might reconfigure the postcommunist discursive space. It might challenge that frame in 
which pragmatism demands the delegitimation of capitalism's counterculture illegitimate. It might mean an 
escape into utopia, into imagination, in order to enhance the vision of alternatives. Without utopia, Adorno once 
wrote, the future can only be a smooth extension of the presemg8 This culture of commitment to democratic 
alternatives must be cultivated in a field which up to this point has emphasized the importance of imitating that 
thought to be a proven success, however. 
The challenge of this kind of discourse -- protest, proletarian movements and left culture -- to civil 
society is absolutely vital. It is one central cultural opposition that civil society needs to incorporate for it to become 
an emancipatory vision once again. When movements and politics are identified as inconsistent with civil society 
because they either undermine its economic base or represent the past, they are effectively escluded from the 
conversation about how to reconstruct the society. In this sense, Ekiert and Kubik *'are on the right track when 
they argue that public protest and social movements must be s e n  as one of the fundamental ingredients of civil 
society's reconstruction in Eastern Europe. Movements must be part of it, for they can espand the agenda of civil 
society. At the same time, the ideologies framing movements must move beyond the dichotomous thinking 
characteristic of the opposition to communism. Unreal socialism might be just the vehicle to derail the 
socialist/civil society opposition. 
OCCUPATION, NATIONALISM AND LEGAL RIGHTS 
The end to communist rule in the post-Soviet societies took place with a different dynamic than that in 
Eastern Europe. The mobilization of civil society, most obvious in the Baltics and in Armenia, later Ukraine, took 
place only in the mid-1980s, after Gorbachev had initiated the campaign for glasnost '. Topdown revolution was 
thus fundamentally more important in the Soviet Union than it was in Poland, or even in Hungary, where the 
formal independence (as opposed to colonial status) gave opposition activists potentially more room for maneuver. 
Furthermore, civil. society in the Soviet space had less developed state and social structures within which to grow 
and few formal structures to facilitate mobil i~at ion.~ 
One of the principal exponents of civil society in  astern Europe, Adam Michnik, embodies in his 
arguments some of the problems we seek to highlight in this section. Even in the mid-1980s, Michnik worried 
about the fundamentalisms within Solidarity itself, that a new antagonism was being developed between 
proponents of an open society and those of a closed ~ociety.~'  Indeed, the challenge of such a politics for civil 
society's emancipation and labilities are obvious. Today, fundamentalism's major threat seems to come from those 
who refuse to allow those communists and former communists oriented toward the open society respect for their 
own biographies so that the future, rather than the past, can be the object of public gaze.'* Nevertheless, when 
asked about the distinction of the nation in the project of making civil society, Michnik paints a mixed picture. 
On the one hand, he continues to identify those who would construct their own 'particular' rouie to modernity, 
and who see Europe and universal principles as a threat, as those who are also likely to restrict the openness of 
society. For Michnik, movement toward Europe is a movement toward civil society. Those who fear Europe also 
limit civil society. Michnik's Hungarian colleague, Gyorgy Konrad, says something similar: 
The self-shrinking national strategy takes what it considers non-national and delights in condemning it. The 
self-expanding national strategy takes anything from the outside world that can be.fruitfully related to what was 
previously considered national and delights in integrating the two.93 
Michnik, however, recognizes that there are moments, even for the advocate of European identity, that elevate a 
national identity above all others. When Russian nationalists talk about the indefinability of their global interests, 
for instance, Michnik's owvn Polishness surges. He then speaks as a Pole, anxious about national security.94 The 
considerable consensus in Central Europe, for instance, about membership in NATO is another illustration of this 
impulse, one that embraces the model of European civil society but wants with it a European sense of security. 
The "small nation complex" prioritizes security in the discourse of emancipation. But given the relative 
security of borders in East Central Europe, the "small nation complex" can be subordinated among liberal thinkers' 
in Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic. It cannot be so easily subordinated in the Baltics. 
In this section of the paper, we treat the "smallnation complex" using case studies of Latvia and Estonia, 
two of the three Baltic countries.95 Both Estonia and Latvia continue to fear for their safety and existence, and 
perceive these threats to be both internal and external. Fully 43% of ethnic Estonians in March 1996 dejnitely 
believed that "Russia is a danger to the independence of Estonia" and another 36% thought it probably was, while 
only 14% of Estonian Russians considered it likely at all.%- Distrust of the Russian migrant population in Estonia 
and Latvia has led to a close regulation of citizenship, while the fear of a resurgent Russia has undergirded the 
pursuit of rapid integration into European political and military structures. Thus, to consider one of the not so 
obvious challenges to critical sociologists in the expansion of the civil society concept, one should consider the 
relationship between civil society, the small nation and large state imperialism. 
In the Soviet Baltic republics, civil society actively helped to end communism.97 These were 
overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, nationed civil societies whose principal emancipatory strategy was to 
emphasize the oppression of the titular nationalities under Soviet occupation. 0ve; tiine, civil society was 
revitalized. It was especially powerful in the mobilization of national populations around issues of environmental 
protection and the "reclamation" of national histories. It was also apparent in the establishment of Popular Front 
alliances of reform communists and radical oppositionists. It was apparent in the relatively open election 
campaigns for the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet in 1989 and 199 1. In March 199 1, 
referendums were held in the Baltics and majorities in all three republics voted in favor of "democratic and 
independent" states . Full independence was proclaimed during the failed coup of August, 199 1 and in early 
September, 199 1, the Soviet Union recognized Baltic independence 
One illustrative narrative of postcommunist achievements can be found in Mart Laar's celebration of 
Estonia as a 'success story'.98 Estonia, he writes, 
is usually classed with Slovenia and the Czech Republic as having gone the farthest down the 
road away from socialist authoritarianism and toward democracy and a market-based economy. 
When wve regained our independence, 92 percent of our trade was with Russia.. Our industry and 
agriculture were a shambles ... Inflation was running at the rate of 1,000 percent a year, and in 
1992 alone our GDP fell by 30 percent. Basic goods like bread, milk and fuel were strictly 
rationed. On top of all that, we faced challenges to our political stability from estremists of the 
right and the left, while rising tensions between the native population and a largely Russian 
community (that immigrated during the period of Soviet occupation) seemed for a time as if they 
might spill over into overt conflict. Today, all these problems are receding so rapidly ... like 
distant memories. Estonia has changed beyond recognition. We have reoriented our economy, 
going from dependence on the East to trade with the West. Inflation has dropped, and exports 
are increasing.. Extremists ... have been sidelined ... Ethnic tensions have greatly decreased and a 
large majority of those residents who are not ethnically Estonian now support Estonia's 
independence. 
Estonia is also trying to stake its claim in a European identity. Estonian Foreign Minister Siim  alla as^^ 
says this, for instance: 
Political and economic integration with the European Union has developed into a top priority in 
Estonia's foreign policy, and more and more in domestic policy as well. .... We are a European 
people and we are able to keep our identity only by belonging irrevocably to Europe, oily 
together with other nations striving for the same goal. To belong irrevocably to Europe and to 
take part in developing its fbture is something Estonia can do only as a full fledged member of 
the European Union. 
In many ways, Estonia is a major success story. Ethnic tensions have not led to violence and there are 
reasons to see Russian integration into Estonian national and linguistic structures as p o s s i b ~ ~ . ' ~  Similarly, in 
Latvia, whose titular nationality is even less demographically advantaged than in Estonia, tensions exist around 
contentious issues like citizenship, but quotidian concerns dominate over political ones for most of the population. 
For the most part, ethnic groups coexist peacefully in both republics. Nonetheless, in post-Soviet states like the 
Baltics, which host large.Russian immigrant populations, issues of ethnicity and nationalism remain central to the 
consideration of civil society's limiting as well as emancipatory potentials. 
While individual rights and freedoms are central to the Baltic conception of democracy, the principle of 
individual emancipation does not stand alone here. Rather, while the state extends civic guarantees of individual 
rights, it is also seen as the guarantor of national survival. Hence, it also esists to ensure group rights, most 
notably, those of the "primary nation." Even political organizations that embrace "Europe" and the of 
civil society, are not normally inclined to move outside of the boundaries of this conception. Within the discourse 
that legitimates this dual definition of rights, the tension between the two is not apparent because it is mitigated by 
the narrative of national survival and security constructed around the story of national oppression that dates at least 
and most powerfully from the Soviet era. Even after independence, the narrative that renders the.historical events 
of Soviet occupation, mass deportation, and oppression episodes101 in a story about national survival, continues to 
play a powerful structuring role. In a 1996 speech at the national parliament (Saeinra ), Latvia's Prime Minister 
Andrejs Skele remarked that "Europe to us [in Latvia] is a symbol of the desired feeling of security and standards 
of welfare." Civil society, in this story, then, looks less to be an end in itself, as it is theorized, for example, in New 
Social Movements. Civil society is also a means to achieving national security and s u ~ v a l .  
It is useful to consider how ethnic relations are posed in the narrative of Baltic independence. Estonian 
Human Develo~ment Rewrt 1995Io2, a United Nations publication, which also reflects a more centrist position 
than that represented by Mart Laar, offers a point from which to begin. Immigration is posed this way: 
As a nationally homogeneous country where Estonians formed 97.3 percent of population in 
1945, Estonia has become the country of residence for peoples of more than one hundred ethnic 
groups over the last fifty years. Non-Estonians as of 1989 comprised approximately 40 percent of 
the total population'03.... The share of Estonians in Estonia's population decreased steadily form 
1950 to 1989. Only the regulation of immigration after the approval of the Law on Immigration 
in 1991 and the sharp decrease of illegal immigration to Estonia after the closure of the borders, 
have resulted in an approsimately three percent increases in the share of ethnic Estonians of the 
population from 1989 to 1994 ....Io4 
The publication acknowledges that integration of these Soviet era immigrants is "one of the largest problems 
facing Estonia", but the ball is put into the minorities' camp. For integration to happen, the minorities must 
demonstrate their loyalty to the Estonian state. Thus, an extension of citizenship rights (like the right to vote in 
national elections) takes time: 
An absolute majority of non-natives in Estonia, including the Russians (90% according to a poll 
in December 1994), have decided to remain permanently in Estonia, and most of them also 
intend to apply for Estonian citizenship. The legal process is timeconsuming, and Russian 
speakers have also had problems in learning Estonian. It is consequently obvious why relatively 
few of the non-Estonians living in Estonian have received citizenship via naturalization so 
far.""' 
The UN report points out that there are independent cultural associations, including organizations of 
minorities, as well as an "Ethnic Rights Information Centre of Estonia in Tallinn," founded in 1994 as a civic 
initiative. Further, Estonia's joining of the European Union Convention on Ethnic Minorities in February 1995 
provides 'significant guarantees to minorities in Estonia, primarily in questions concerning their legal 
protection."'06 The document also notes that non-Estonian political parties are being formed and the national law 
on language mandates that the Estonian government provide more resources for Russian language instruction. 
To consider how remarkable Estonian containment of the 'Russian minority threat' is, one needs to 
consider how politically excluded a large segment of the Russian population is. Although Russians constitute close 
to 38% of the residents of Estonia, all of the deputies elected to Parliament in 1992 were ethnically Estonian. In 
1996,6 deputies were Russian. Vello pettaiIo7 has argued that a major reason violent conflict became 
hndamentally less likely than it was when pro-Soviet agitators stormed parliament in May 1990 is because ethnic 
conflict and disparities in political power are constituted through legal categories that are ethnically neutral, even 
while the net effect is exc~us ive . '~  The Estonian government based their claim to exclusive power on a legal 
continuity, and by arguing that Sovietera in-migration was a violation of that law, the Estonian leadership could 
claim to embrace the norms of civil society even while escluding a third of their population from political 
enfranchisement. In this way, the West's historic resistance to recognizing the Soviet occupation of the Baltics as 
legal enabled the Estonians to argue that this esclusion of Soviet-era immigrants was reasonable, a claim that the 
West accepted grudgingly. log 
The resistance of noncitizens to (permanent or temporary) disenfranchisement from the political realm 
may be mhed for other reasons too. First, they likely see a dearth of options for living elsewhere than Estonia or 
Latvia. Few believe that they would be better off in Russia, a disposition reinforced by the low proportion of non- 
Baltic immigrants who have opted to leave the c~untr ies ."~ The quality of life in the Baltics is, as it was in the 
Soviet period, almost invariably higher than that in Russia. Second, a segment of the Russian population has 
. realized significant success in business. One'does not need citizenship to set up a business. While Latvians and 
Estonians may dominate politics in their home countries, Russian economic power in civil society is not incidental. 
Citizenship may not, in fact, be so important for some citizens. Less than 5% of noncitizens with the right to 
become citizens have applied for and undergone naturalization in Latvia. Although the challenge of language tests, 
the cost of a naturalization fee and a lack of information can explain some of this, it also reflects the wishes of 
young male noncitizens to avoid the obligatory military service: Too, if one retains the old Soviet passport, one 
also need not obtain a visa to travel to Russia, while Latvian citizens do."' 
Estonian social scientists tend to pose problem this way: they ask whether Russians are prepared to accept 
their identity as a 'minority'. After all, these social scientists argue, Russians came en masse after Estonia was 
illegally occupied by Soviet power and continued to arrive as massive industrial projects, links in the Soviet chain 
of production, were constructed there: They were not voluntary immigrants as much as they were colonists. 
Russian immigrants were then the majority because they were an extension of the politically and linguistically 
dominant Russian majority in the USSR. Few embraced or understood Estonian ways or language. Where 
Russians continue to embrace an identity of a majority nation (the concomitant sentiment of which is understood as 
non-recognition of the newly independent states as legitimate), a small nation's civil society is denied legitimacy. 
It is not uncommon to hear, for example, Latvians in Latvia arguing against full enfranchisement of Sovietera 
immigrants because they fear that the new citizens would vote to rejoin a Russian political body.lI2 Political 
inclusion's value is, hence, relative to the risk it is understood to pose to the rights of the nation and the 
sovereignty of the state. 
The issue is larger than that of large internal minorities, and includes fear of resurgent Russian 
nationalism and imperialism in Russia proper . In 1996, for instance, the Estonian Defense Minister, Andrus 
~ o v e l , " ~  said that Russia must change its approach to analyzing threats. In addition to seeing dangers to its 
security, Russia should also analyze the idea that it could represent a threat to other countries. In the week before 
the 1996 presidential elections in Russia, Boris Yeltsin suggested that the Baltic countries should join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and, in late 1997, he suggested that Russia would provide "security 
guarantees" for the Balts (an offer that was unequivocally declined). Baltic independence is regarded by some in 
Russia as a threat, affront, or aberration: communist Gennadi Zyuganov said that Estonia "could not exist without 
being a parasite on Russia"; Alexander Lebed, promised in 1996 that "if NATO expands into Estonia ... this 
country will have no future"; Vladimir Zhirinovsky declared that he will construct giant fans along Russia's 
border to blow radioactive waste into the Baltic states.'I4 The perceived (and actual) threat from outside of small 
states like the Baltics, then, needs to be considered in the evaluation of civil society's realization and potential, 
especially where esternal threats (like those from Russia) are widely conflated with and understood as reinforcing 
internal threats to security, sovereignty, and survival. 
The ambiguities, then, of civil society are quite apparent. On the one hand, the exclusion of Russian 
migrants from full participation in the political process is a violation of the inclusive vision that most civil society 
activists endorse."' On the other hand, the discourse of national survival in the Baltics is a long-running narrative 
that might be said to underlie the commitment to civil society itselfI6, in part because it recognizes in the civil 
society vision a means for realizing goals that include national security, sovereignty, and survival. Civil society 
discourse, to the extent it means integration into European.security structures and protection from Russian 
expansion, is compatible with this small nation complex. This same concern, however, leads to an exclusionary 
practice toward Russian migrants. The narrative of civil society in the Baltics thus can be understood only in so far 
as it is connected to the narrative of national survival and security and the fate of the nation. And for civil society 
to reflect an emancipatory project that takes into account just such a lifeworld, it must engage the problem of the 
small nation before a potentially imperialist power. 
CONCLUSION 
The narrative of civil society is therefore appealing for a number of reasons. Its linkage to a larger 
international discourse of rights and organizational membership mitigates the potential arbitrariness of any' 
national power. It provides to some degree an external observer that might assess how well civil society is 
developing. Of course the principles of civil society, and especially the rule of law, can be manipulated to construct 
exclusionary strategies. The Baltic cases illustrate that just such an embrace of legalistic principles has reduced the 
drift toward fundamentalist identities, as it makes the criteria for inclusion attainable and explicit. To the extent 
these criteria are not manipulated for obvious political ends, they will create better conditions for the adjudication 
of difference. Indeed, the degree to which Baltic postcommunist development has proceeded peaceably is already 
..' 
remarkable testimony to the value of the civil society perspective in these conditions of ethnic exclusion. 
Political exclusion may be just cause for protest, but here the significance of thinking about what identities 
are acknowledged as part of civil society's present and fbture must also be addressed. To the extent the immigrant 
community is theorized as a remnant of illegal occupation, a present reminder of past domination and future 
endangerment, one of the very limitations of civil society is apparent. The state must be a compatible actor in the 
provision of liberty and justice. The relevant state is not only the sovereign state, but also surrounding states. To 
remove Russia from complicity in this limitation of civil society's emancipatory potential would be to 
disenfranchise the particular narrative Balts articulate: how is it that a small nation might survive? Therefore, we 
need to find a way of articulating the politics of becoming not only within a nation-state and civil society, but 
within a larger global framework that does not take for granted national security. This is a major challenge for 
Western critical theorists unaccustomed to theorizing the threat of a Russian or Soviet imperial project. 
Critical theorists are much more accustomed to the problem with socialism and social movements, but 
postcommunist Eastern Europe sets up the problem differently here again. In these movements we can see the 
tension between the past and present in operation -- as movements challenge the authority of the national state or 
private economy, they also invite identification as legacies of the past brought fonvard. When they are identified as 
an element of the past, they are then cast as being unaware of how democracy works and how a private economy 
develops. These are familiar delegitimizing tactics across the world, but they are especially powerful in 
postcommunist societies trying to shed the legacy of that dysfunctional past. Before dismissing anti-communist 
narratives simply, however, these very repertoires of contentious action were embedded in the civil society project 
that hastened the communism's finish. In this terrain, therefore, the question about what forms of life and social 
activity.'fit' with the civil society project are the most wide open and accessible to political intellectual 
engagement. It is too easy for Western critical theorists to dismiss the allergy most East Europeans have for that 
which tastes of socialism. On the other hand, East Europeans need to find a way to articulate the socialist vision in 
a frame that resonates with the deepening of civil society. 
Clearly, social movements and collective protest continue to be important means in identity formation and 
the articulation of difference, but to the estent they cannot translate this public opposition into new forms of 
interest articulation and institutional power, their place in the postcommunist order is unclear. Indeed, one may 
recall Jadwiga Staniszkis's powerful question: to what estent was the Solidarity movement during communism in 
fact helping to reproduce communistn by calling for the reallocation of surplus rather than challenging the 
institutional mechanisms through which decisions about that surplus allocation were made?'" In this sense, it is 
wrong to simply lament the demise of movement activity or, for that matter, to praise every industrial conflict that 
emerges. In many cases, the liberal critics might be right: these conflicts may work to reproduce the industrial 
structures that impede the reconstruction of the national economy and the construction of the kind of private . 
economy that enables the civil society Gellner celebrates. 
For this reason, notions like 'unreal socialism' are appealing. To the extent that any ideological 
formation stabilizes its meaning around a particular set of fixed qualities, that ideological formation seems to 
constrain its own emancipatory potentials. Individualism vs. collectivism is one particularly limiting antagonism. 
Indeed, one reason that civil society was so compelling in the 1980s was that it was suturing those elements that a 
formal theory of civil society might find antagonistic -- labor movements, public demonstrations, private economy, 
national identity, communist reformers and liberal intellectuals. One reason why civil society is so limiting today 
is that it has become a formula that leading politicians and businessmen must embrace in order to articulate with 
larger systems of power. And that articulation demands exclusion of those who do not fit the model. We propose 
that civil society's critical potential is limited precisely by such esclusions of the "unfit". A critical theory of civil 
society might do well by considering whether the premises that guide esclusion are themselves the barriers to civil 
society's continued theoretical, and political, power. 
Critical social theory embraced civil society in the 1980s in part because it was part of an emancipatory 
movement, not only opposing the forms of domination associated with Soviet-type society but also because the 
vision itself was expanding as different forms of social activity were identified as its expression. Today, civil 
society is the discourse of power, and tends to be defensive, rather than expansive, in its theoretical work. As we 
seek to articulate civil society with unreal socialism and small nation nationalism, however, civil society might 
regain its more critical edge. It might again become a vision of transformation that is not limited to Eastern 
Europe. Indeed, it might find new commonalities with other proletarians and small nations in a globalized space 
where capital and large nations reign. 
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